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Abstract
Background
Healthcare and other front-line workers are at particular risk of infection with Ebola virus
(EBOV). Despite the large-scale deployment of international responders, few cases of
Ebola virus disease have been diagnosed in this group. Since asymptomatic or pauci-symp-
tomatic infection has been described, it is plausible that infections have occurred in health-
care workers but have escaped being diagnosed. We aimed to assess the prevalence of
asymptomatic or pauci-symptomatic infection, and of exposure events, among returned
responders to the West African Ebola epidemic 2014–2016.
Methods and findings
We used snowball sampling to identify responders who had returned to the UK or Ireland,
and used an online consent and questionnaire to determine their exposure to EBOV and
their experience of illness. Oral fluid collection devices were sent and returned by post, and
samples were tested using an EBOV IgG capture assay that detects IgG to Ebola glycopro-
tein. Blood was collected from returnees with reactive samples for further testing. Unex-
posed UK controls were also recruited.
In all, 300 individuals consented, of whom 268 (89.3%) returned an oral fluid sample
(OFS). The majority had worked in Sierra Leone in clinical, laboratory, research, and other
roles. Fifty-three UK controls consented and provided samples using the same method.
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Of the returnees, 47 (17.5%) reported that they had had a possible EBOV exposure.
Based on their free-text descriptions, using a published risk assessment method, we classi-
fied 43 (16%) as having had incidents with risk of Ebola transmission, including five interme-
diate-risk and one high-risk exposure. Of the returnees, 57 (21%) reported a febrile or
diarrhoeal illness in West Africa or within 1 mo of return, of whom 40 (70%) were not tested
at the time for EBOV infection.
Of the 268 OFSs, 266 were unreactive. Two returnees, who did not experience an illness
in West Africa or on return, had OFSs that were reactive on the EBOV IgG capture assay,
with similar results on plasma. One individual had no further positive test results; the other
had a positive result on a double-antigen bridging assay but not on a competitive assay or
on an indirect EBOV IgG ELISA. All 53 controls had non-reactive OFSs. While the partici-
pants were not a random sample of returnees, the number participating was high.
Conclusions
This is the first study, to our knowledge, of the prevalence of EBOV infection in international
responders. More than 99% had clear negative results. Sera from two individuals had dis-
cordant results on the different assays; both were negative on the competitive assay, sug-
gesting that prior infection was unlikely. The finding that a significant proportion experienced
“near miss” exposure events, and that most of those who experienced symptoms did not get
tested for EBOV at the time, suggests a need to review and standardise protocols for the
management of possible exposure to EBOV, and for the management of illness, across
organisations that deploy staff to outbreaks.
Author summary
Why was this study done?
• A large number of international volunteers worked in West Africa during the largest
Ebola outbreak ever seen, but only a small number of international staff were diagnosed
with Ebola virus disease. Since asymptomatic or unrecognised infections can occur, it is
possible that some infections in international responders to the epidemic were missed.
What did the researchers do and find?
• We carried out an online survey and antibody testing of oral fluid samples from 268
individuals who returned to the UK and Ireland after working in West Africa during
the Ebola outbreak. A high number of near miss events were reported, and less than a
third of individuals who experienced illness whilst in West Africa or soon after return
were tested for Ebola virus while they were unwell. Of the 268 who were tested for anti-
bodies, two had reactive test results, but these were not reactive on further testing.
Ebola exposure in international responders
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What do these findings mean?
• Although our study could not reach every individual who returned to the UK after
working in West Africa during the Ebola outbreak, we demonstrated that asymptomatic
or pauci-symptomatic Ebola virus infection was rare in international healthcare and
other workers in our study who responded to the epidemic in West Africa.
• The descriptions of near miss events and the finding that many of those who experi-
enced illness were not tested at the time suggest that protocols for the management of
possible exposure to Ebola virus and for the management of illness should be reviewed
and standardised across organisations that deploy staff to outbreaks.
Introduction
In Ebola virus disease (EVD) epidemics, healthcare workers (HCWs) are disproportionately
affected. In the West African 2014–2016 Ebola epidemic, the percentage of HCWs infected
was 1.45% in Guinea (compared to 0.02% in the general population), 8.07% in Liberia (com-
pared to 0.11%), and 6.85% in Sierra Leone (compared to 0.06%) [1]. The outbreak occurred
in countries that have some of the lowest proportions of HCWs per head of population in the
world [2]. This fact—coupled with the rapid spread of the epidemic, the high case fatality rate
[3–7], and serious concerns raised by the international community—motivated the World
Health Organization (WHO) to declare the outbreak as a “public health emergency of interna-
tional concern” and resulted in the escalated deployment of international emergency medical
teams (EMTs) to West Africa (primarily to Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone) beginning in
late 2014 [8]. These EMTs included water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) and laboratory
workers, epidemiologists, engineers, logisticians, and operations staff as well as clinicians. To
date, WHO reports that 40 organisations from 19 countries sent EMTs to West Africa in
response to the 2014–2016 Ebola outbreak [9]; over 3,000 individuals were deployed to West
Africa by the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention alone [10]. Despite this large-
scale deployment, few cases of EVD were diagnosed among EMT workers: 24 were treated in
Europe or the US [8].
In Kikwit, Democratic Republic of the Congo, in an Ebola outbreak in 1995, 8/402 (2%)
HCWs in the outbreak area had positive serology in the absence of diagnosed EVD. Among
asymptomatic household contacts of cases, the prevalence of positive serology has ranged from
1% to 46% in different studies using different assays [11–16]. More recently, serology positive
for Ebola virus (EBOV) infection was found in 12.0% (11/92) of household contacts with
symptoms in Sierra Leone, and 2.6% (10/389) of those with no symptoms, using a highly sensi-
tive and specific IgG assay [17]. A recent meta-analysis estimated that 27% of all infections are
asymptomatic [18], with similar findings from a “hot spot” in Sierra Leone [19]. It is therefore
plausible that asymptomatic or pauci-symptomatic infections have occurred in HCWs but
have escaped being diagnosed.
We describe the prevalence of antibodies to EBOV in oral fluid samples (OFSs) from indi-
viduals who returned to the UK or Ireland after responding to the West African EVD epi-
demic, as well as potential exposures to EBOV and experience of illness in West Africa or
within 1 mo of return.
Ebola exposure in international responders
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Methods
Recruitment
Invitations to participate were sent to individuals known to the authors, and through organisa-
tions supporting EMT deployment involving UK-based staff, including non-governmental
organisations (NGOs), UK government-affiliated institutions, and the London School of
Hygiene & Tropical Medicine (LSHTM). A request was embedded in both the email and at the
end of the online questionnaire to forward the email to other eligible persons—“snowball sam-
pling” [20]. The email described the purpose of the study and the methods of data collection,
and included a link to an online information sheet, consent form, and questionnaire.
The study was also advertised via posters and cards at selected meetings that eligible indi-
viduals were likely to attend (with permission from the meeting organisers). The study infor-
mation and a link to the survey were also distributed via social media platforms (Facebook and
Twitter).
UK control individuals with no known exposure to filoviruses were also recruited at
LSHTM and through personal contacts.
An online consent procedure was employed for this study and consisted of an information
sheet and consent form included at the beginning of the online survey (see S2 Text). The sur-
vey was accessible only after consent and was opened on 16 December 2015 and closed on 16
June 2016. Ethics approval was obtained from the LSHTM Research Ethics Committee
(approval #9475). All data were stored on the LSHTM secure data server and were subject to
file access logging.
Eligibility criteria
Eligible participants were18 y of age, had travelled to West Africa during the 2014–2016
EVD outbreak as part of the response, had never tested positive for EBOV by PCR, and had
never received a filovirus vaccine.
UK controls were ineligible if they were <18 y of age, had taken immunosuppressant medi-
cation in the past year, had spent a prolonged period (>1 mo) in any country with EBOV
transmission, had ever had contact with patients with exposure to or infected with filoviruses,
had worked with filoviruses in a laboratory setting, or had participated in a filovirus vaccine
study.
Questionnaire
The questionnaire asked for basic demographic information and information about returnees’
deployment to West Africa, and any occupational risks or potential exposures (see S2 Text).
Returnees were asked if they had experienced a febrile illness during their deployment or
within 1 mo of return. For those using personal protective equipment (PPE), details were
asked about the methods used for doffing. A broad definition of PPE was used but included a
protective suit (with or without hood) with gloves (single or multiple pairs) and with eye pro-
tection, with or without respiratory protection.
Oral fluid collection kit
Oral fluid collection devices (Oracol S10, Malvern Medical Developments) were sent via the
UK postal service to consenting eligible individuals. Returnees collected the OFS using a
sponge massaged along the gum line for 90 s. Returnees could follow a pictorial instruction
leaflet or follow a link to a video demonstration (http://tinyurl.com/lshtmsample).
Ebola exposure in international responders
PLOS Medicine | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1002300 May 16, 2017 4 / 18
In order to minimise potential delays, a request to post specimens within 24 h of collection
was included. Specimens were stored at −80˚C˚C within 24 h of receipt at LSHTM. Collection
continued until 300 returnees had consented to participate and recruitment was slowing. All
analyses were done after the end of data collection.
Sample testing
The OFSs were tested for EBOV glycoprotein IgG using an IgG capture assay. Oral fluid
EBOV glycoprotein IgG levels have been shown to be closely correlated with plasma IgG level
(R2 = 0.78) [14]. In a field study in Sierra Leone, the assay had a sensitivity of 96% (93/97 recov-
ered patients with PCR-confirmed EVD tested positive) and a specificity of 100% (339/339
controls tested negative) [17]. Testing was carried out in two batches on 12 May 2016 and 22
June 2016, and samples received after 22 June 2016 were destroyed. Specimens were defrosted
and extracted with 1 ml of transport medium. One hundred microlitres of extract was incu-
bated in individual wells coated with anti-human IgG, along with two positive and two nega-
tive controls, before being washed. A conjugate of recombinant EBOV Zaire (Mayinga strain)
glycoprotein antigen (rGPδTM, cat. 0501–016, IBT Bioservices) coupled with horseradish per-
oxidase antigen was added, further incubated, then washed. Bound conjugate was detected
using TMB substrate, and optical density (OD) measurements were made on an ELx808 Ultra
Microplate Reader (Biotek Instruments) and analysed using Kineticalc software for Windows
(BioTek). The cutoff for each plate was taken as the mean of the negative controls in that plate
plus 0.1 OD, derived from a standard curve method applied to samples reported elsewhere
[21,22]. In order for a plate to be valid, the OD of the positive control had to be>1.0, and that
of the negative control<0.1. Normalised ODs (NODs) were calculated using the ratio of the
test OD to the defined test cutoff. A NOD> 1 was considered reactive.
Those with reactive OFSs were contacted, and 5 ml of blood was collected. Plasma samples
were tested at Public Health England (PHE) for EBOV RNA using a real-time pan-Ebola PCR
[23], and for EBOV antibodies using the IgG capture assay and, additionally, a competitive
ELISA that included a labelled murine monoclonal 4G7 antibody and a double antigen bridg-
ing assay (DABA), both of which use the same recombinant glycoprotein as the IgG capture
assay. Finally, plasma samples were sent to the Jenner Institute in Oxford, where they were
tested using an ELISA that detects IgG to glycoprotein of EBOV Mayinga strain (amino-acids
1–649 of GenBank protein AHX24649.1), an in-house assay used to measure Ebola vaccine
response [24]. Because of a limited supply of recombinant glycoprotein antigen and monoclo-
nal antibody at PHE, no negative samples were tested using these second-line tests. The posi-
tive control in all PHE tests was a 1:200 dilution of serum from a recovered UK Ebola patient.
No internal quality control was incorporated to verify the presence of adequate total immuno-
globulin in the OFSs, but all samples were checked visually to ensure that the un-extracted
swabs were not dry.
Statistical methods
Analyses were performed using STATA 14 (StataCorp).
The risk of infection in individuals was categorised as very low, low, intermediate, or high,
using the stratification devised by Jacobs et al. [25], applied to the survey free-text answers
from returnees, with modification to include breaches in PPE. Using this system, being physi-
cally close (<1 m) to an individual with confirmed EVD whilst not wearing PPE, or with a
breach in the PPE, constituted very low risk if there was no direct physical contact, low risk if
there was direct physical contact, and intermediate risk if the patient had vomiting, diarrhoea,
or bleeding. Contact with body fluids, either directly from a patient or with the environment,
Ebola exposure in international responders
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was considered intermediate risk if there was no exposure onto broken skin or mucous mem-
branes or high risk if there was contact with these areas. In transcutaneous exposure (such as a
needle stick injury), risk was considered high if the sharp was a freshly used hollow-bore nee-
dle and high if the sharp object had been contaminated by contact with a confirmed EVD
patient or body fluids. The risk from a percutaneous injury was considered intermediate if the
sharp was not known to have been directly contaminated [25].
Factors associated with risk of exposure, experiencing a febrile/diarrhoeal illness in West
Africa or within 1 mo of return, and being tested for EBOV during such illness were deter-
mined using logistic regression. Factors reaching p< 0.1 in the univariate analysis were
included in a multivariable model. Tests for trend were calculated using the likelihood ratio
test to compare a linear model with a categorical model.
Results
Participants
It was not possible to estimate the number who received the survey via email, but online con-
sent was received from 300 individuals, all of whom completed the survey; of these, 268
(89.3%) returned an OFS and were included in the analysis. Fifty-three UK control partici-
pants consented and provided an OFS using the same procedures.
Descriptive data
The median age for those who returned a sample was slightly older than for those who did not
(39 versus 33 y, respectively; p = 0.07); all other characteristics were similar between the
groups. Of the 268 returnees who returned samples, 152 (57%) were female; the median age
was 36 y (interquartile range [IQR] 30–45). The majority had most recently worked in Sierra
Leone (253, 94%) and had worked in PPE (230, 86%) (Table 1). The median age of the controls
was 35 y (IQR 31–40), and 35 (66%) were female.
Contact and exposure
Possible exposure was ascertained through several different questions, and free-text responses
were encouraged to describe incidents more fully. Twenty-one (8%) individuals reported hav-
ing had direct physical contact with patients with confirmed or suspected EVD whilst not
wearing PPE. Fifty-five (21%) answered “yes” (47) or “unsure” (8) when asked whether they
had had a significant exposure or a “near miss” event. Using the free-text descriptions, expo-
sures were allocated a level of risk of transmission (Box 1). In all, 43 (16%) individuals had
potential exposures: 27 (10%) very low risk, 10 (4%) low risk, five (2%) intermediate risk, and
one high risk (Fig 1).
Table 2 shows the factors associated with reporting any transmission risk compared to
reporting no/unclear risk. The amount of time spent in PPE in the laboratory or the clinical
red zone was associated with increased odds of experiencing an EBOV transmission risk (p for
trend = 0.02, excluding those not wearing PPE). Returnees were more likely to report an expo-
sure risk if they had been performing a clinical role (29% of 123) compared to a laboratory role
(3% of 90) (odds ratio 13.4 [95% CI 3.8–47.0] after adjusting for time in PPE) (Table 2). After
adjusting for role and days in PPE, no other factors were associated with risk. The different
methods of PPE removal were associated with the role, so were not independently associated
with risk.
Over one-third of returnees reported contact with recovered EVD patients (98/268, 37%).
Most of these (57/98, 58%) were direct physical contact (handshaking or embracing) with
Ebola exposure in international responders
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patients at the time of discharge from an Ebola treatment centre (ETC), which was encour-
aged. Others described living or working with recovered patients (9, 3%) or contact within a
follow-up clinic setting (14, 5%), or they reported contact but did not provide a clear descrip-
tion (18, 7%). These contacts were not included as transmission risks.
Self-reported illness and testing
Among 268 returnees who were never known to have had EVD, 57 (21%) experienced a
febrile/diarrhoeal illness either in West Africa or within 1 mo of return. Table 3 shows the fac-
tors associated with illness and with being tested for EBOV if the returnee experienced diar-
rhoea and/or fever.
Clinical staff were the most likely to have experienced an illness; 29% (35 of 123) compared
to 20% (11 of 55) of “other” staff and 12% (11 of 90) of laboratory staff (p< 0.01) (Table 3).
After adjusting for role, no other factors were associated with illness.
Table 1. Characteristics of 268 individuals who travelled to West Africa in response to the 2014–2016
Ebola epidemic.
Characteristic Number (percent) or median
(IQR)
Demographics
Female 152 (56.7%)
Age (years) 36 (30–45)
Country most recently worked in
Sierra Leone 253 (94.4%)
Liberia 12 (4.5%)
Guinea 3 (1.1%)
Roles undertaken (returnees could select more than one)
Laboratory 95
Physician 70
Nurse 54
Research 37
Management/operations 28
Trainer 23
Epidemiologist 19
Community engagement/tracing 18
WASH staff 11
Finance 3
Engineer 3
Pharmacist 2
Social worker/burial team/information technology/journalist/visitor/
logistician/nutritionist1
7
Worked in PPE (laboratory or clinical) 233 (86.9%)
Time in country (days) 30 (20–40)
Previous experience
Laboratory work with filoviruses 11
Haemorrhagic fever outbreak 7
Both lab and outbreak work 3
1One returnee reported each of these roles.
IQR, interquartile range; PPE, personal protective equipment; WASH, water, sanitation, and hygiene.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1002300.t001
Ebola exposure in international responders
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Box 1. Examples of risk classification, and associated free-text
descriptions from the survey, among 268 individuals who travelled
to West Africa in response to the 2014–2016 Ebola epidemic
No or unclear risk: direct contact with local population with no known illness; torn
outer glove, inner glove intact.
“Children and some adults would approach you unexpectedly and grab your arm etc.
Contact with locals, they did not look ill as were mainly walking on streets or playing”
“Torn glove in isolator but remaining gloves intact and no fluid contact”
Very low risk: living or working with someone with undiagnosed EVD but no direct
physical contact; breaches in PPE with no visible contamination or broken skin exposure
“Torn suit when caring for a sick woman who was fitting”
“Facemask dislodged”
“Person I was staying in same accommodation with became infected”
Low risk: direct physical contact with patient who does not have vomiting, diarrhoea, or
bleeding.
“Contact with subsequently confirmed infected Medic. . .contact was symptomatic
but ‘dry’”
“A local colleague working at our ETU [Ebola treatment unit] came to work while
symptomatic for approximately 5 days without informing us, he tested positive and
died from EVD a week later”
Intermediate risk: direct physical contact with a patient with diarrhoea, vomiting, or
bleeding; direct contact with bodily fluids from a patient with EVD.
“Cut hand on artesunate vial (through gloves) whilst in red-zone”
“Being vomited on while wearing just gloves”
“Touched mask with blood on gloves (could not breathe—had to pull mask from
face)”
High risk: exposure of mucous membranes or broken skin to bodily fluids from an EVD
patient, or sharp injury from a needle/other used on an EVD patient (not freshly used or
not hollow-bore needle).
“Sharp injury with a broken vial of medication inside the red zone with dirty and con-
taminated gloves”
Ebola exposure in international responders
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Amongst 57 returnees who experienced a febrile/diarrhoeal illness, 30% (17 returnees)
were tested for EBOV infection at the time. One of 21 (5%) who fell ill in country had an
EBOV PCR, compared to 11 of 17 (65%) who fell ill on return (odds ratio 36.7 [95% CI 3.9–
244.8]). Of those who were ill and were classified as having no or unclear risk (47 returnees),
12 (25%) were tested, compared to five of the ten (50%) with some risk. The individual with a
high-risk exposure did not describe an illness and was not tested. Of the five with intermedi-
ate-risk exposures, three were ill, and two of those were tested.
Laboratory results
The frequency of NOD values for the 268 OFSs are shown in Fig 2, alongside those from 53
controls. All the samples from UK controls and all but two of the samples from returnees were
well below the cutoff (maximum NOD 0.7). The two samples that were reactive on the first test
had similar results on re-testing. Plasma from these individuals was tested further, as described
below.
Participant A
Participant A was a female laboratory worker who spent a total of 30 d in an Ebola laboratory
in West Africa. She did not describe a significant exposure or febrile illness, and was not tested
with PCR for EBOV infection at any point during her deployment or on return.
The OFS was reactive on three tests, with NOD 3.55, 3.27, and 3.12. In plasma, the IgG cap-
ture assay was reactive twice (NOD 4.5 and 5.4), the DABA was reactive twice (NOD 2.6 and
3.2), but the competitive assay was unreactive twice (NOD 0.44 and 0.49), and the in-house
indirect ELISA test at the Jenner Institute was unreactive. The EBOV PCR on plasma was
negative.
Participant B
Participant B was a female physician who spent 40 d in the clinical red zone, did not describe a
significant exposure or any illness, and was not PCR tested for EBOV infection during her
deployment or on return. The OFS showed a low level of reactivity on the IgG capture assay
(NOD 1.05, 1.26, and 0.88). Similar low-level reactivity was seen in the IgG capture assay of
Fig 1. Risk of Ebola virus disease transmission in 268 individuals who travelled to West Africa in
response to the 2014–2016 Ebola epidemic. PPE, personal protective equipment.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1002300.g001
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Table 2. Factors associated with risk of Ebola virus disease transmission in 268 returnees who worked in West Africa during the 2014–2016 Ebola
outbreak.
Factor Number (percent) Risk of EVD transmission, n
(percent)
Unadjusted OR
(95% CI)
Adjusted OR1
(95% CI)
p-Value
Sex
Female 152 (56.7) 20 (13.2) 1
Male 116 (43.3) 23 (19.8) 1.6 (0.8–3.1)
Age group (years)
19–30 73 (27.2) 8 (11.0) 1
31–40 99 (36.9) 19 (19.2) 1.9 (0.8–4.7)
41–50 45 (16.8) 8 (17.8) 1.8 (0.6–5.1)
51 51 (19.0) 8 (16.7) 1.5 (0.5–4.3)
Country
Sierra Leone 253 (94.4) 41 (16.2) 1
Guinea/Liberia 15 (5.6%) 2 (13.3) 0.8 (0.2–3.7)
Facility2
Facility 1 72 (26.9) 16 (22.2) 1
Facility 2 67 (25.0) 7 (10.5) 0.4 (0.2–1.1)
Facility 3 53 (19.8) 3 (5.7) 0.2 (0.1–0.8)
Facility 4 13 (4.9) 6 (46.2) 3.0 (0.9–10.2)
Other 63 (23.5) 11 (17.5) 0.7 (0.3–1.7)
Role3 <0.01
Laboratory work 90 (33.6) 3 (3.3) 1 1
Clinical work 123 (45.9) 35 (28.5) 11.5 (3.5–38.9) 13.4 (3.8–47.0)
Other role4 55 (20.5) 5 (9.1) 2.9 (0.7–12.7) 8.7 (1.6–47.4)
Days in PPE5 0.02; test for
trend, 0.026
1–25 77 (28.7) 13 (16.9) 1 1
26–35 83 (31.0) 9 (10.8) 0.6 (0.2–1.5) 1.3 (0.5–3.6)
36–60 38 (14.2) 9 (23.7) 1.5 (0.6–4.0) 2.3 (0.8–6.4)
>60 22 (8.2) 9 (41.0) 3.4 (1.2–9.6) 4.7 (1.5–14.8)
None 48 (17.9) 3 (6.3) 0.3 (0.1–0.4) 0.3 (0.1–1.4)
Previous viral haemorrhagic fever work
No previous work 247 (92.2) 41 (16.6) 1
Previous work 21 (7.8) 2 (9.5) 0.5 (0.1–2.3)
PPE removal—chlorine spray7
No spray 98 (36.6) 7 (7.1) 1
Chlorine spray 132 (49.3) 33 (25.0) 4.3 (1.8–10.3)
Not applicable 38 (14.2) 3 (7.9) 1.1 (0.3–4.6)
PPE removal—assistance7
No assistance 108 (40.3) 13 (12.0) 1
Assistance 122 (45.5) 27 (22.1) 2.1 (1.0–4.3)
Not applicable 38 (14.2) 3 (7.9) 0.6 (0.2–2.3)
1Only days in PPE and laboratory work were included in the final model.
2Facility is the Ebola treatment centre or holding facility at which the returnee was predominantly based. Facilities 1–4 were the most commonly reported
facilities.
3It was possible to select more than one role. Where individuals selected both laboratory and clinical red zone (n = 3), they were allocated to the role in
which they reported more time in subsequent questions. “Clinical” includes nurses, doctors, and paramedics.
4Other roles include those listed in Table 1.
5Thirty-eight individuals did not spend any time in PPE. An additional ten did not provide information on the duration of time in PPE.
6Excluding those who did not wear PPE.
7On exiting the clinical red zone or laboratory. PPE removal was not included in the final model since method of removal was almost collinear with role.
CI, confidence interval; EVD, Ebola virus disease; OR, odds ratio; PPE, personal protective equipment.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1002300.t002
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plasma (NOD 1.40 and 1.24). The plasma was unreactive on DABA (NOD 0.43 and 0.41), on
the competitive assay (NOD 0.47 and 0.45), and on the Jenner Institute indirect ELISA. The
EBOV PCR on plasma was negative.
Discussion
This is the first examination to our knowledge of possible undiagnosed infections with EBOV
in international HCWs and other responders working during the West African 2014–2016
Ebola outbreak. More than 99% had no reactivity on the screening test, making undetected
infection, at most, a very rare event. The two individuals with reactive tests for IgG to EBOV
glycoprotein antigen reported no significant exposure. One of these individuals demonstrated
a level of reactivity around the cutoff, illustrating non-specific reactivity, a possible finding in
serological diagnostics [26]. The other individual had results that were reactive in the IgG
Table 3. Factors associated with experiencing an illness in 268 returnees from the West African Ebola 2014–2016 outbreak, and factors associated
with having been tested for Ebola virus in 57 who experienced an illness.
Factor Number (percent) Experience of
illness, n (percent)
OR (95% CI) p-Value Tested for Ebola
virus, n (percent)
OR (95% CI) p-Value
Sex
Female 152 (56.7) 32 (21.1) 1 10 (31.3) 1
Male 116 (43.3) 25 (21.6) 1.0 (0.6–1.9) 7 (28.0) 0.8 (0.3–2.7)
Age group (years)
19–30 73 (27.2) 20 (27.4) 1 6 (30.0) 1
31–40 99 (36.9) 21 (21.2) 0.7 (0.4–1.4) 6 (28.6) 0.9 (0.2–3.6)
41–50 45 (16.8) 8 (17.8) 0.6 (0.2–1.4) 1 (12.5) 0.3 (0.0–3.3)
51 51 (19.0) 8 (15.7) 0.5 (0.2–1.2) 4 (50.0) 2.3 (0.4–12.6)
Role1 <0.01
Laboratory work 90 (33.6) 11 (12.2) 1 4 (34.4) 1
Clinical work 123 (45.9) 35 (28.5) 2.9 (1.4–6.0) 12 (34.3) 0.9 (0.2–3.8)
Other role2 55 (20.5) 11 (20.0) 1.8 (0.7–4.5) 1 (9.1) 0.2 (0.0–1.9)
Risk of EVD
No risk/unclear 225 (84.0) 47 (20.9) 1 12 (25.5) 1
Risk 43 (16.0) 10 (23.3) 1. 1 (0.5–2.5) 5 (50.0) 2.9 (0.7–11.9)
Facility3
Facility 1 72 (26.9) 14 (19.4) 1 7 (50.0) 1
Facility 2 67 (25.0) 18 (26.9) 1.5 (0.7–3.4) 5 (27.8) 0.4 (0.1–1.7)
Facility 3 53 (19.8) 8 (15.1) 0.7 (0.3–1.9) 1 (12.5) 0.1 (0.0–1.5)
Facility 4 13 (4.9) 7 (53.9) 4.8 (1.4–16.6) 3 (42.9) 0.8 (0.1–4.7)
Other 63 (23.5) 10 (15.9) 0.8 (0.3–1.9) 1 (10.0) 0.1 (0.0–1.1)
Illness outcome <0.01
Illness in country 21 (36.8) 1 (4.8) 1
Illness in UK 17 (29.8) 11 (64.7) 36.7 (3.9–244.8)
Other cause 19 (33.3) 5 (26.3) 7.1 (0.8–68.0)
1It was possible to select more than one role. Where individuals selected both laboratory and clinical red zone (n = 3), they were allocated to the role in
which they reported more time in subsequent questions. “Clinical” includes nurses, doctors, and paramedics.
2Other roles include those listed in Table 1.
3
“Facility” is the Ebola treatment centre or holding facility at which the returnee was predominantly based. Facilities 1–4 were the most commonly reported
facilities. Facility was not included in the adjusted model since it was almost collinear with role.
CI, confidence interval; EVD, Ebola virus disease; OR, odds ratio.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1002300.t003
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capture assay at a level seen in recovered EVD patients [17], and reactive in a DABA, but not
in a competitive assay and not in a separate indirect IgG ELISA. Both the capture assay and the
DABA employ exactly the same recombinant antigen (EBOV glycoprotein); therefore, concor-
dant positivity on both could be expected. The competitive assay, however, uses the monoclo-
nal antibody 4G7, a constituent of the proposed therapy for EVD ZMAb [27], which competes
with the participant’s own antibody for binding on the same recombinant EBOV glycoprotein
and is expected to be inherently more specific. The result in this returnee could be explained
through cross-reactivity, the presence of an antibody that binds to a single epitope on the
EBOV glycoprotein used in the PHE IgG capture assay that was not present on the EBOV gly-
coprotein used in the Jenner Institute IgG indirect ELISA and was not produced in response
to EBOV infection. Alternatively, the returnee could have been infected with a small inoculum
and generated a minimal subsequent memory B cell response resulting in either a low-avidity
antibody or one with a limited epitope profile. A low-titre antibody does not seem an adequate
explanation since the geometric mean titres of antibody in asymptomatic undiagnosed house-
hold contacts of cases of EVD in Sierra Leone were not significantly different from those of
recovered patients [17]. Since the returnee was not ever symptomatic, displayed a lack of con-
sistent and robust reactivity on serological assays, and did not have detectable plasma viraemia,
clinical follow-up was not deemed necessary, and was refused when offered.
Oral fluid EBOV IgG has been shown to have excellent concordance with plasma EBOV
IgG, and the EBOV IgG capture assay has demonstrated excellent sensitivity and specificity
[17]. Using this assay, seropositivity was found in 2.6% of 389 asymptomatic household con-
tacts in Sierra Leone [17]. Using assays of different formats, 7.5% of 187 previously undiag-
nosed contacts were seropositive in Sierra Leone [19], and between 1% and 46% in previous
outbreaks [11–13,15,16], although considerable concern has been expressed about the
Fig 2. Normalised optical density results for IgG in oral fluid samples from 268 individuals who
travelled to West Africa in response to the 2014–2016 Ebola epidemic, and 53 UK controls.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1002300.g002
Ebola exposure in international responders
PLOS Medicine | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1002300 May 16, 2017 12 / 18
specificity of the assays used to generate these data [16,28]. In our study, samples were col-
lected from individuals at various lengths of time after their return from West Africa, but no
more than 2 y. The magnitude of the antibody response has been shown to decrease over time
in some vaccine studies [29] but remained detectable several years after natural infection in
previous outbreaks [30]. It is possible that the sensitivity of the assay was decreased by the OFS
remaining at room temperature during postage; however, this seems unlikely as antibody con-
centrations in oral fluid have demonstrated stability at various temperatures for up to 7 d
when tested using capture assays similar to that used in our study [31].
We demonstrate no evidence of infection with EBOV in individuals who were considered
to have had a risk of transmission, or in returnees who had febrile or diarrhoeal symptoms
during the potential incubation time for EBOV. A worrying proportion of responders had had
direct physical contact with confirmed or suspected EVD patients, or near miss or exposure
events inside the red zone, many of whom met similar exposure risk criteria to those adminis-
tered favipiravir as post-exposure prophylaxis [25]. None of the returnees reported having
been medically evacuated or having received post-exposure prophylaxis, but this was not
asked about directly.
Reporting an event classified as very low, low, intermediate, or high risk for EBOV trans-
mission was associated with performing a clinical role rather than a laboratory role. Broken
vials and laboratory PPE breaches in Ebola laboratories have been described [32]. However,
laboratory work may allow greater risk prediction and protocol-guided management than
working with patients, who may present with confusion during the course of EVD [6]. Regular
debriefing after work in the clinical red zone or laboratory and blame-free reporting of near
misses should be part of routine practice in EMT response work. Together with the further
development and publication of tools through which exposure risk can be graded, staff should
be given realistic advice about their level of risk to reduce confusion and avoid anxiety, while
allowing those with more than minimal risk to be identified. Responses from returnees who
participated in this study could be used to inform ETC design and workforce planning to pre-
vent potential EBOV exposure. For example, reports of staff experiencing skin lacerations
from broken glass vials in the red zone should lead to consideration of a complete ban on the
use of glass vials in this area. Reports of dislodged or torn PPE should lead to further testing of
the robustness and fit of PPE suits, careful design of ETCs so that suits are not torn by catching
on doorways or corners, and confirmation that protocols exist in each ETC for the manage-
ment of PPE failure whilst in the red zone.
Performing a clinical role (nurses/doctors/paramedics) was strongly associated with
describing an illness, compared to laboratory work or undertaking other roles. Clinical staff
wore PPE for the majority of clinical interactions, minimising the risk of acquiring any infec-
tion from EVD patients. However, caring for unwell colleagues or mixing more with West
African national staff may have increased this group’s exposure to transmissible pathogens to
which they were immune-naïve, such as upper respiratory tract viral infections. It is concern-
ing that a high proportion of returnees who experienced a febrile or diarrhoeal illness whilst
within West Africa or within a month of return were not tested with PCR for EBOV at the
time.
Being tested for EBOV infection was more strongly associated with experiencing an illness
while in the UK compared to while still in West Africa. Illness in West Africa may have
resulted in admission to a treatment centre where other confirmed EVD patients were being
cared for, or medical evacuation to the UK. Although these would have been alarming for the
individual and costly for the organisation or country of origin, earlier presentation with illness
has been associated with improved survival [33,34]. The policies of NGOs, where available,
were reviewed by the authors and frequently stated that EBOV should be tested for “after a
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period of observation” and if symptoms have “not resolved or progressed”. The pragmatic
nature of these policies should be viewed in the context of the anxiety induced by testing, as
well as potential exposure whilst inside a testing facility [35]. This study provides a reassuring
lack of evidence of EBOV infection in individuals who had not previously been tested for
EBOV, but who had had an illness consistent with mildly symptomatic EVD. Review, critique,
and agreed standardisation of protocols for the management of illness in nationally and inter-
nationally recruited staff during outbreaks should be instigated.
This study included 268 individuals who returned OFSs. It was not a random sample, and it
is possible that those who knew of possible exposures or who had had symptoms were particu-
larly keen to participate. PHE conducted routine screening of all individuals who returned to
the UK from West Africa at the peak of the epidemic, between 14 October 2014 and 4 Decem-
ber 2015. During this time, 646 individuals were designated low risk of exposure (including
WASH staff, epidemiologists, health advisors, and contact tracers) or high risk of exposure
(including HCWs providing EVD patient care, morgue workers, and burial teams) [36]. The
use of oral fluid for testing, along with the use of a self-sampling device, is likely to have
increased response rates and participation in our study [37]; it avoided the discomfort and
inconvenience of blood sampling, and improved logistics for sample collection, given the geo-
graphical spread of returnees across the UK and Ireland.
By restricting the study to international staff, only 11 of whom had previous experience
with filoviruses, we could evaluate the risk of contracting EBOV while working in PPE or oth-
erwise responding to the epidemic, without the unquantifiable risk experienced by national
HCWs who may have been exposed to infected family members, friends, and colleagues. Such
contacts have been identified as the source of infection in the majority of HCW infections in
Sierra Leone [38]. We were also able to evaluate potential transmission to individuals who
worked in roles that did not predominantly involve direct work with patients with EVD,
including epidemiologists, community engagement staff, researchers, and support staff such as
those in finance or IT. Some of these individuals described contact with both positive and
recovered cases, and considered that they had had near miss events or significant exposures. A
clear correlation between level of exposure to EVD cases and their body fluids and the risk of
acquiring EVD has been documented previously [17,39]. It is possible that potential transmis-
sion events or levels of risk were not captured in this study, particularly around variation in
the eye protection component of PPE; EBOV had been detected in lung tissue [40], and trans-
mission has been documented in individuals who did not recall physical contact with a con-
firmed case from whom they acquired infection [41].
Reporting a previously undisclosed illness during the incubation period for EVD, or not
immediately reporting a near miss event, may be met with criticism or even professional disci-
plinary review [42]. Nevertheless, the returnees who participated in this study seemed willing
to report these events. This was helped by avoiding face-to-face interaction through the use of
an online consent form and questionnaire—a method that has been previously demonstrated
to increase reporting of socially undesirable responses [43]—and by explicitly stating in the
questionnaire that we would not identify specific treatment facilities or NGOs.
Conclusion
The vast majority of international responders to the EVD epidemic who participated in this
study had no evidence of EBOV infection. This should provide additional evidence in support
of the effectiveness of ETC infection prevention and control procedures and of PPE. In view of
the lack of evidence of infection in spite of the frequency of symptoms consistent with EVD
(fever and diarrhoea), and the disconcerting level of under-testing at the time, consideration
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should be given to revising and standardising policies for management of illness. The level of
concern expressed by returnees about potential exposure to EBOV both inside and outside red
zone areas should highlight areas for improved support for national and international staff,
and a need to standardise protocols for assessment and management of exposures between
organisations.
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